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Introduction
What Are the Early Lessons?
Sheldon Danziger 
University of Michigan
The papers in this volume were commissioned and presented at a 
conference held in November 1998 in Washington, D.C. The Joint 
Center for Poverty Research at the University of Chicago and North 
western University organized the conference, which was funded by the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE) 
at the Department of Health and Human Services. Assisting me in 
planning the conference were Greg Duncan of Northwestern Univer 
sity and Donald Oellerich of ASPE. Special thanks are due to the con 
ference discussants and participants, who provided valuable sugges 
tions for the revisions that are published here, and to Julie Balzekas 
and Diane Kallenback for excellent staff assistance.
Based on early analyses of the effects of the 1996 welfare reform 
act, this introduction focuses on three key questions: Why are case 
loads falling? How are recipients faring? How are the states respond 
ing?
REFORMING WELFARE
Welfare reform has generated a great deal of interest in the 1990s. 
No other domestic policy has generated such intense media coverage, 
popular discussion, and policy debate. This round of welfare reform 
began when presidential candidate Clinton gave a 1992 campaign 
speech calling for dramatic changes in welfare policy: "No one who 
works full-time and has children at home should be poor anymore. No 
one who can work should be able to stay on welfare forever." Shortly 
after Clinton took office, he appointed an interagency task force to turn
2 Danziger
this promise into legislation. At the time, few expected the years of 
contentious debate that ensued. In the summer of 1994, the Clinton 
administration issued its welfare reform plan; it was set aside after the 
Republican victory in the 1994 elections. A Republican welfare 
reform plan that had been part of the "Contract with America" shaped 
much of the subsequent debate. In August 1996, amid great contro 
versy, Congress passed and the president signed P.L. 104-93, the Per 
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA).
Since 1996, much attention has focused on the effects of 
PRWORA. In this volume, economists and policy analysts use the best 
data that are currently available and sophisticated research techniques 
to answer some key policy questions. Their goal is to evaluate what 
has happened to date and what is likely to happen as the business cycle 
ebbs and flows in the coming years. In particular, the authors were 
asked to use their analyses to predict what is likely to happen to wel 
fare caseloads, to recipient well-being, and to state budgets and poli 
cies when the next recession arrives. The authors present their 
estimates and predictions, but they leave it to the reader to weigh the 
available evidence and decide how successful PRWORA has been in 
its first few years of "ending welfare as we know it" and to consider 
how welfare reform might be further reformed when the 1996 act 
comes up for re-authorization.
The 1996 act represents a dramatic change in the way cash assis 
tance and services are delivered to single mothers and their children. 
The Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program had 
evolved over the previous 60 years to provide cash benefits to all who 
met state and federal eligibility criteria. Benefit levels were set by the 
states, but total costs for this entitlement program were shared between 
the states and the federal government. The Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) program, which replaced AFDC, now pro 
vides greater discretion to the states concerning eligibility criteria, 
work requirements, and other programmatic rules. In return, the fed 
eral government provides a block grant of fixed size to each state and 
no longer shares in the cost increases or decreases associated with ris 
ing or falling caseloads. The provisions of TANF are discussed in 
detail in this volume, especially in the chapters of Part III.
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Welfare reform has led to a more rapid decline in the cash assis 
tance caseload than most analysts would have predicted in 1996 when 
the act was signed. In part, this is because few analysts predicted that 
the economy would continue to grow so rapidly with so little inflation 
and with such low unemployment rates. As the papers in Part I discuss, 
welfare caseloads began falling several years before PRWORA became 
law, but caseload declines have accelerated since that time.
Consider the trend in the number of welfare recipients (first under 
AFDC, now under TANF) from 1960 to December 1998 (Figure 1). 
The caseload rose rapidly in the aftermath of the "War on Poverty" 
from about 4 million persons in the mid 1960s to about 10 million by 
the early 1970s; it then fluctuated between 10 and 12 million until the 
early 1990s, when it rose to about 14 million. By December 1998, the 
caseload had declined to about 7.5 million, 47 percent below the level 
of January 1994 and 38 percent below the level of August 1996. l The 
four papers in Part I of this volume analyze the causes of these case 
load fluctuations, primarily through 1996, due to data constraints.
Reducing caseloads is a major goal of welfare reform, but it is not 
the only goal. One issue that has not been resolved in the few years 
since PRWORA was enacted is how recipients who have left the rolls 
are faring in the labor market. How interested are employers in hiring 
them? What kinds of jobs are they getting? How much are they earn 
ing? The tight labor markets and low unemployment rates of the late 
1990s provide the best possible environment for welfare recipients 
who are entering the labor market. As a result, the caseload declines 
have been accompanied by increased employment among unmarried 
mothers. However, the increased employment has not led to increased 
economic well-being for some former recipients, and some of the most 
disadvantaged single mothers have been unable to find jobs. The two 
papers in Part II address these issues.
Some other recent studies that have focused on all single mothers, 
regardless of welfare participation, are relevant to understanding the 
overall labor market context in which welfare reform is proceeding. 
First, more unmarried mothers are working. According to Gary Burt- 
less (1998), by 1998 the employment-to-population ratio of unmarried 
mothers—divorced, separated, and never-married women—had caught 
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only 2.2 percentage points in the 14 years prior to 1993, but rose 11.5 
points between that year and 1998.
Second, the poverty rate for single mothers remains quite high, in 
part because welfare caseloads have fallen much faster than the poverty 
rate. Consider the trend in the official poverty rate for families with 
female householders and no husband present (the group from which 
most welfare recipients are drawn). According to the Census Bureau 
(P-60, no. 201), the 1997 rate (35.1 percent) is about the same as the 
1989 rate (35.9 percent) and the 1979 rate (34.9 percent). This sug 
gests that many of those who are leaving the cash assistance rolls 
remain poor. It is possible, however, that the data for 1998 and 1999, 
when available, will show that poverty rates have fallen further as the 
economy has continued to grow and caseloads have continued to fall 
during these years.
On the other hand, the experience in the year following PRWORA 
suggests caution. Wendell Primus (1999) documents that disposable 
income increased on average for all single mothers between 1993 and 
1997. Yet, the poorest fifth of single-mother families, many of whom 
are current or former welfare recipients, had less disposable income in 
1997 than in 1995. The disposable income of the next fifth of these 
families was unchanged over these two years because declines in 
income from public assistance programs offset increased earnings and 
benefits from the Earned Income Tax Credit.
Although there has been some discussion about how families that 
were receiving cash assistance are faring, much greater attention has 
been given by policy makers and the media to caseload declines. A few 
studies on how families are faring have recently appeared, and many 
more will appear in the next few years. It takes time to gather and eval 
uate this evidence, as it is more difficult to follow families leaving wel 
fare and find out about their incomes than it is to count the number of 
families remaining on the welfare rolls. Several continuing studies 
and the Cancian et al. study (Chapter 6 in this volume) suggest that 
reductions in caseloads do not mean that most families who leave the 
rolls are "making it." Recipients are looking harder for jobs in 
response to the increased policy pressure than were recipients prior to 
1996; and, in part because the labor market is so tight, many are getting 
jobs. Greater numbers of recipients have left the rolls than are getting 
jobs, however.
6 Danziger
In addition, in some states, recipients have been terminated from 
the rolls because of rule changes, not because they are finding jobs. 
For example, a report in The New York Times ("West Virginia Trims 
Welfare, but Poor Remain," March 7, 1999) noted that West Virginia 
had begun to count child Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits 
as income for TANF recipients, rendering them ineligible for TANF 
benefits regardless of their ability to find work. A court ruling subse 
quently overturned this policy. Yet, this demonstrates that some states 
have instituted administrative rule changes that have reduced case 
loads, with little regard for the employability of the affected recipients. 
For example, some states are pursuing diversion policies that attempt 
to minimize the number of applicants who enter the rolls, and other 
states, sanction policies that attempt to maximize exit from the rolls.
To date, all studies, including those in this volume (which were 
completed in early 1999) can provide only short-term responses to the 
questions posed here. Because it has only been three years since wel 
fare reform was passed and because macroeconomic conditions have 
been unusually good, we do not yet know how families who have left 
the rolls will fare in the long run or in ordinary or recessionary eco 
nomic periods. Some recipients who have left the rolls, even if they 
now have earnings below their former welfare benefit level, may gain 
additional hours of work and/or wage increases if they stay employed. 
Of course, their current situation might be better than their long run 
prospects because the labor market is so tight.
Over the next few years, we will learn much more about the issues 
analyzed in this volume. For now, however, the chapters that follow 
tell us about what we have learned so far and speculate about what 
might happen in the long run. In particular, the authors consider what 
is likely to happen during an economic slowdown: How responsive are 
caseloads to changes in economic conditions and policy changes? 
How are recipients likely to fare as employer willingness to hire them 
fluctuates over the business cycle? What policy changes might state 
governments undertake? I now turn to a brief summary of the chapters. 
Parts I, II and III are organized around the three broad questions: Why 
are caseloads falling? How are recipients faring? How are the states 
responding?
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WHY ARE CASELOADS FALLING?
The four chapters in Part I analyze trends in welfare caseloads in 
recent years, with particular emphasis on sorting out how much of the 
caseload changes—increases in the late 1980s and early 1990s, fol 
lowed by decreases—can be attributed to macroeconomic conditions 
and how much to welfare reform policy changes. A careful reading of 
all four papers, each of which uses different data or different estima 
tion strategies, shows how difficult it is to explain caseload changes.
In their chapter, David Figlio and James Ziliak attempt to reconcile 
a controversy about the relative effects of changes in the unemploy 
ment rate and pre-TANF changes in state welfare policies on the wel 
fare caseload. In 1997, a paper by staff members of the President's 
Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) attributed more than one-third 
of the decline in caseloads between 1993 and 1996 to declining unem 
ployment and less than one-third to state waiver policies. Another 
1997 paper by Ziliak, Figlio, and colleagues attributed a greater share 
to the former and a smaller share to the latter. In their replication of the 
CEA model, about one-third of the caseload decline is again attributed 
to the economy, but only about one-sixth to waivers; their preferred 
models attribute about half to three-quarters of the change to the econ 
omy, but virtually none to welfare reform. Figlio and Ziliak conclude 
that these differences are due to the fact that the CEA uses a static 
model, while they prefer a dynamic one, and that "the primary conse 
quence of controlling for caseload dynamics is to reduce the role of 
welfare reform relative to the macroeconomy in generating the decline 
in AFDC caseloads." They also point out that welfare reform has 
played a larger role in the post-PRWORA caseload decline than it did 
prior to 1996.
Geoffrey Wallace and Rebecca Blank analyze trends in both AFDC 
and food stamp caseloads for the 1980-1996 period. They document a 
significant unexplained increase in both caseloads, even after they con 
trol for a broad range of economic, demographic, political, and policy- 
related variables. During the 1994-1996 period, about half of the 
AFDC caseload change is attributed to the unemployment rate and 
about one-fifth to state welfare waivers, but for the 1994-1998 period, 
a much smaller part of the decline is due to unemployment rate
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changes. They conclude that, based on their historical estimates, "the 
expected effect of any future one-point increase in unemployment will 
be to increase TANF caseloads by 4 to 6 percent and food stamp case 
loads by 6 to 7 percent." This suggests that a severe recession that 
raises the unemployment rate by 3-4 percentage points, to 7.5-8 per 
cent, would leave welfare caseloads well below the levels reached in 
the early 1990s. They conclude that the 1996 welfare reform seems to 
have achieved a large reduction in caseloads independent of the state of 
the economy.
Robert Moffitt applies the CEA methodology not to time series 
data, but to micro data from the 1976-1996 Current Population Sur 
veys. This allows him to focus more directly on specific population 
groups such as less-educated women, who are most likely to be 
affected by welfare reform, and to examine not only changes in welfare 
caseloads, but also changes in earnings and family income. He finds 
that state welfare waivers reduced AFDC participation rates among 
women without high school degrees and increased their labor force 
attachment, but had little effect on their earnings. Women who were 
high school graduates fared better: their AFDC participation rates fell, 
their work effort increased, and their earnings also increased.
In the last chapter of Part I, Timothy Bartik and Randall Eberts 
extend the kinds of models estimated by the CEA, Figlio and Ziliak, 
and Wallace and Blank to include measures of economic conditions 
other than unemployment rates, notably labor demand factors. They 
focus on state employment growth, the wage premium associated with 
an area's industrial mix, the educational requirements implied by the 
industrial mix, and the extent to which a state's industries tend to 
employ welfare recipients. They find that a welfare recipient faces 
greater barriers to employment than does a typical worker because of 
low educational attainment and greater volatility in industries that tend 
to hire recipients, and that caseloads are higher in states with higher 
concentrations of industries that hire more educated workers. They 
conclude that the national trend toward higher educational require 
ments in many industries can account for some of the increase in wel 
fare caseloads in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
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HOW ARE RECIPIENTS FARING?
The two chapters in Part II focus on the labor market, first on recip 
ient work and earnings outcomes and then on employer willingness to 
hire welfare recipients. The findings are similar to those in the Moffitt 
and Bartik/Eberts chapters; i.e., the least-skilled have the hardest time 
making it in the labor market.
Maria Cancian and her colleagues review evidence from several 
data sources about the post-welfare work effort and the economic well- 
being of former recipients. Although most former recipients can find 
some work, most cannot get and keep full-time, year-round work. In 
their analysis of pre-TANF data from the National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth, in each of the five years after exit, about two-thirds worked. 
However, in any of these years, only about one-sixth to about one- 
quarter worked full-time, full-year. The same was true in the post- 
TANF Wisconsin administrative data they analyze; during the first year 
after leaving the rolls, about two-thirds of leavers worked. They also 
found that most former recipients (at least in the first few years) will 
earn relatively low wages, between $6.50 and $7.50 per hour. This is 
not surprising, given that welfare recipients have low skills and that the 
real wages of less-skilled workers have fallen dramatically over the 
past quarter century and have not increased much during the current 
economic boom.
This finding about the wage prospects of less-skilled workers is 
not new. It was the motivation for the proposal of the first Clinton 
administration "to make work pay and end welfare as we know it." 
This suggests that former welfare recipients will continue to need gov 
ernment income supplements if they are to support their family at 
incomes above the poverty line. The expanded Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) has a very important role here, as does post-welfare 
access to subsidized child care, health care, and food stamps. As the 
Cancian et al. chapter cautions, "Even consistent work may not suffice 
for self-support if wages are low . . . The relatively modest growth in 
wages for this sample is inconsistent with the suggestion that even if 
former welfare recipients start in low-paying jobs, they will soon move 
on to jobs that pay wages that can support a family above the poverty 
line." The good news in Wisconsin for the sample of families that had
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left the welfare rolls is that twice as many of them were above the pov 
erty line relative to those remaining on the rolls. Yet, only 27 percent 
of those who left cash assistance and did not return escaped poverty, 
and only about one-third of all leavers obtained the income level they 
received just before they left welfare.
An additional caveat is in order. The first wave of data from a 
panel study of welfare recipients being conducted at the University of 
Michigan2 shows that women remaining on welfare have characteris 
tics, not evaluated in most studies of recipients, that make their labor 
market prospects more problematic than those of all single mothers 
and even those of recipients who have already left the rolls. The study 
examined 14 potential barriers to employment, including major depres 
sion, post-traumatic stress disorder, maternal health, child health, labor 
market skills, perceived experiences of discrimination, and several 
standard human capital measures. It found that about 75 percent of 
single mothers who received cash welfare in February 1997 and had 
zero or one of these barriers were working in Fall 1997, whereas only 
about 40 percent of those with four or more barriers were working. As 
welfare caseloads continue to decline, this suggests that the recipients 
who remain will be the least employable.
Harry Holzer presents evidence from his survey of a large sample 
of employers in several metropolitan areas in Michigan. He concludes 
that labor market tightness has a substantial effect on employer 
demand for welfare recipients. Like Cancian et al., he finds that most 
welfare recipients can get some work when labor markets are very 
tight, as they have been in the late 1990s. In fact, many of the employ 
ers whom Holzer interviewed in Fall 1997 told him that they were will 
ing to hire welfare recipients in 1998, although many had not yet done 
so. Thus, a recession is likely to significantly reduce employer demand 
for less-skilled workers in general and welfare recipients in particular, 
because, at the time of the interviews, the employers expected labor 
market tightness to increase and they were already having difficulty 
filling current vacant positions. Holzer estimates that a recession 
would reduce demand for recipients by 25 to 40 percent from current 
levels, suggesting that the employment experience of recipients may 
provide a classic example of the "last hired, first fired" syndrome. In 
addition, he finds that employers are more receptive to many public 
interventions on behalf of welfare recipients (such as tax credits for
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hiring or training workers) because of current labor market tightness 
and their difficulty in finding qualified workers.
HOW ARE THE STATES RESPONDING?
The three chapters in Part III all focus on what states are doing 
now and how they are likely to respond when a recession comes. This 
is unchartered territory, as PRWORA has given states a fixed block 
grant along with greater discretion. The block grant provides states in 
each year with an amount of federal funds that is the higher of the 1994 
or 1995 level or the average for the 1992-1994 period. Because wel 
fare caseloads were much higher during these years than they now are, 
this has produced a financial windfall for the states. However, as the 
authors discuss, the federal government will not share the increased 
welfare costs associated with a recession as it did in the past.
LaDonna Pavetti analyzes how states have begun to implement the 
new work-oriented welfare system in a "resource-rich" environment. 
Given available resources and declining caseloads, many states have 
provided expanded job search assistance and support services to many 
more recipients than was the case prior to PRWORA. The challenge 
when the economy turns down, according to Pavetti, is that state 
resources will be fixed, the number of recipients seeking assistance 
will increase, jobs will be harder to find, and time limits will have 
come into effect in a greater number of states. She concludes that 
given the emphasis on mandatory work, it may be necessary to broaden 
the definition of what constitutes participation in a work activity. 
Alternatives include increased use of vocational education or training 
programs, participation in community work experience or public ser 
vice employment programs, or volunteer activities in the community.
Pavetti's concerns are important given the difficulty of many 
former recipients in finding stable employment in the tight labor mar 
ket of 1998 and 1999. She suggests that states should begin experi 
menting with community service employment or work-for-your- 
welfare policy options now, while caseloads are still declining and 
resources are plentiful. The next recession is likely to occur when 
some single mothers will have already exhausted their lifetime eligibil-
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ity for TANF benefits. It will be easier to pilot these programs now 
when the labor market is good than to reach the next recession without 
this kind of safety net in place. 3
In his chapter, Phillip Levine examines how much states will likely 
be forced to spend on additional welfare payments in the event of a 
recession. He concludes that costs will rise by $7-14 billion, depend 
ing on the severity of the recession, and this will impose a serious 
financial burden on some states. He also shows that the rules govern 
ing how states can draw funds from the federal contingency fund are 
such that many states will receive little relief. Levine uses the states' 
experiences with the unemployment insurance system to predict how 
states are likely to handle the burden imposed by the increased cycli- 
cality of their welfare spending. His simulations suggest that some 
states will have a very hard time saving for a rainy day.
Howard Chernick and Therese McGuire speculate about how 
states might respond now that the open-ended matching grant program 
of AFDC has been changed to a fixed block grant. They analyze the 
long-run spending responses of governments to other matching and 
block grants and past variations in state revenues and expenditures over 
the business cycle. They argue that because PRWORA's maintenance- 
of-effort requirement limits a state's spending reduction to 20 or 25 
percent of the 1994 level, and because caseloads have already declined 
by so much, the shift to TANF's block grant has not led to immediate 
cuts in benefit levels. Over time, benefits are likely to be, at most, 10 
percent lower as a consequence of the price increase for public assis 
tance that is associated with PRWORA's elimination of matching 
grants. This reduction does not lend support to the idea that there will 
be a "race to the bottom" in state benefit levels. They estimate that in a 
recession comparable in magnitude to the 1990-1991 recession, most 
states should be able to avoid drastic spending cuts. However, in the 
past, some states have sharply reduced their welfare spending in 
response to a downturn, and some states now have tax systems that 
make their revenues especially sensitive to economic downturns. 
Some states, like California, are considered likely to face difficult 
problems by both the Levine and the Chernick/McGuire analyses.
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SUMMARY
Taken together, the chapters in this volume suggest that, in its first 
few years, the 1996 welfare reform has been more successful in some 
dimensions (notably, reducing caseloads) than in others (raising dis 
posable income). Much of the success to date is due to a booming 
economy and to a fiscal environment in which states have more funds 
to spend per recipient than they had in the past. Nonetheless, even 
under these optimal economic and fiscal conditions, some recipients 
have already "slipped through the cracks." The end of entitlement has 
meant that some single mothers, with poor labor market prospects and 
no other means of support, have not received the benefits they would 
have under the pre-PRWORA welfare system. Indeed, there are con 
cerns that some recipients have lost not only their cash assistance, but 
also the food stamp and Medicaid benefits to which they are still enti 
tled.
The chapters collectively raise a cautionary flag that, given current 
rules, much of the success achieved to date may disappear during the 
next recession. The cyclical effects on state budgets will be greater 
during the next recession than they were during previous ones. Then, 
some single mothers will have reached their lifetime benefit limit and 
will require benefit extensions/exemptions; others will not be able to 
get benefits to which they are eligible without some changes in diver 
sion/sanction policies; and both groups may need access to community 
service jobs if they are to avoid serious material hardships.
The authors analyze some of the key issues that Congress and the 
next administration should consider when the 1996 act comes up for 
re-authorization, and they provide a road map for "reforming welfare 
reform" to avoid problems that are inherent in current law. State poli- 
cymakers would also be well-served if they began to make contingency 
plans in response to the authors' projections. To end on an optimistic 
note, the relative success of welfare reform in reducing caseloads may 
have created the fiscal and political context that will allow the reform 
ing of welfare reform in order to better serve those who need further 
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